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RADBRUCH'S FORMULA AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
BRIAN H. BIx*
Gustav Radbruch (1878-1949) was a prominent German legal theorist,
who, in the aftermath of World War II, famously argued that a sufficiently
unjust rule loses its status as a valid legal norm. This article will consider
whether Radbruch's post-war views, as encapsulated in his now-famous
"Formula," are best understood as a conceptual claim about law, or rather as
("merely") a prescription for judicial decision-making.
Part I outlines Radbruch's Formula, while also giving some context
regarding Radbruch's general approach to legal theory, and how it changed
over time. Part II considers whether the Formula is more charitably
understood as a prescriptive theory of judicial decision-making rather than
as a conceptual claim about law.
I. RADBRUCH'S FORMULA(S)
Gustav Radbruch's most influential publications included Grundziige der
Rechtsphilosohie [Main Features of Legal Philosophy] (1914) and
Rechtsphilosophie [Legal Philosophy] (1932).' Those works "reflect[] the
methodological dualism of the Heidelberg neo-Kantians, and contain[]
elements of relativism and legal positivism.,,
2
The Second World War and the evil done during that period in his native
Germany, often under the rubric of law, deeply affected Radbruch. In
works written right after the war, Radbruch offered ideas about the
* An earlier version of portions of this paper will appear as "Radbruch's Formula,
Conceptual Analysis and the Rule of Law," in Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law, ed. Imer B.
Flores & Kenneth E. Himma (Dordrecht: Springer, forthcoming, 2012). I am grateful for the
comments and suggestions of William A. Edmundson, Andrew Halpin, Matthew H. Kramer,
and Stanley L. Paulson.
1. Both are currently available (in German) in Gustav Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe Band
2: Rechtsphilosophie II, ed. Arthur Kaufmann (Heidelberg: C.F. Maller, 1993), the second
volume of Radbruch's collected works; Rechtsphilosophie is also available in an English
translation. "Legal Philosophy," in The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin,
ed. E. W. Patterson, trans. H. Wilk, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), 47-
224 (orig. German pub. 1932).
2. Stanley L. Paulson, "Radbruch on Unjust Laws: Competing Earlier and Later
Views?," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15 (1995): 489.
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connection between the moral merits of a purported legal rule and its legal
validity, that would become highly influential.3 Radbruch wrote:
Positivism is, moreover, in and of itself wholly incapable of establishing
the validity of statutes. It claims to have proved the validity of a statute
simply by showing that the statute had sufficient power behind it to
prevail. But while power may indeed serve as a basis for the "must" of
compulsion, it never serves as a basis for the "ought" of obligation or for
legal validity.
4
He then went on to offer two different elaborations of his Formula:
(1) The positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence
even when its content is unjust and fails to benefit the people, unless
the conflict between statute and justice reaches such an intolerable
degree that the statute, as "flawed law," must yield to justice.
5
(2) Where there is not even an attempt at justice, where equality, the core
of justice, is deliberately betrayed in the issuance of positive law, then
the statute is not merely "flawed law," it lacks completely the very
nature of law. For law, including positive law, cannot be otherwise
defined than as a system and an institution whose very meaning is to
serve justice.6
In Radbruch's article, the second formula is offered as a clear application of
the first formula, but subsequent commentators have, reasonably, treated the
two characterizations as separate formulas. And judges have tended to use
the first formulation, given the likely problems in trying to apply the second
3. Radbruch, "Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law" (orig. pub. 1946) and
"Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy" (orig, pub. 1945), both trans. Bonnie Litschewski
Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26 (2006): 1-11, 13-15.
Most commentators consider these post-War writings to be radical changes of view, in
relation to Radbruch's pre-war writings (e.g., H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morality," Harvard Law Review 71 [1958]: 616), but this claim of discontinuity has
been contested. (e.g., Stanley L. Paulson, "Radbruch on Unjust Laws," 489-500; "On the
Background and Significance of Gustav Radbruch's Post-War Papers," Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 26 [2006]: 17-40). Resolving this dispute about continuity is not important for
present purposes. In focusing on Radbruch's Formula, and associated post-War writings, I
do not mean to slight the significance of his extensive earlier writings, on which, see, e.g.,
Dietmar van der Pfordten, "Radbruch as an Affirmative Holist: What Ought to be Preserved
in His Philosophy," Ratio Juris 21 (2008): 287-403.
4. "Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law," 6.
5. Ibid., 7. Radbruch's Formula is thus a version of what Murphy calls "strong natural
law theory." Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10.
6. "Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law," 7.
Vol. 56
2011
formula, with its focus on legislators' subjective intentions, in actual cases.7
And this article will follow the usual practice of focusing primarily on the
first formulation of the Formula.
In understanding the significance of the Radbruch Formula(s), and their
place both within European jurisprudential thought and within Radbruch's
own work, it helps to compare the Formula(s) with assertions made in
Radbruch's pre-war writings. In his early writings, Radbruch argued that
there were three elements in "the idea of law": justice, "expediency or
suitability for a purpose," and legal certainty. In those writings, Radbruch
seemed to assert that it was the third element, legal certainty, which was the
most important, at least within the idea of law: "It is more important that
the strife of legal views be ended than that it be determined justly and
expediently. The existence of a legal order is more important than its justice
and expediency .... 9
This view then leads Radbruch, in that early work, to say the following
about the role and duties of judges in relation to unjust laws:
[H]owever unjust the law in its content may be, by its very existence.., it
fulfills one purpose, viz., that of legal certainty. Hence the judge, while
subservient to the law without regard to its justice, nevertheless does not
subserve mere accidental purposes of arbitrariness. Even when he ceases
to be the servant of justice because that is the will of the law, he still
remains the servant of legal certainty. We despise the parson who
preaches in a sense contrary to his conviction, but we respect the judge
who does not permit himself to be diverted from his loyalty to the law by
his conflicting sense of the right.'
0
There seems to be a sharp contrast between Radbruch's recommendation in
this earlier work, and what he will prescribe in his later Formula(s). At the
same time, one can certainly see a kind of continuity: Radbruch arguably is
still seeing the same factors in the nature of law; he is simply weighing
them slightly differently, arguing that certainty, even when combined with
7. See, e.g., Frank Haldemann, "Gustav Radbruch v. Hans Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi
Law," Ratio Juris 18 (2005): 166.
8. Radbruch, "Legal Philosophy," 107-8.
9. Ibid., 108 (emphasis in the original). The same year, by coincidence, United States
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis made a similar observation in relation to precedent:
"Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Of course, the Brandeis quotation,
with its careful limitation of "in most matters," leaves open the argument that the treatment
of truly unjust laws should be different.
10. Radbruch, "Legal Philosophy," 119.
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"expediency and suitability," is not always predominant, but must give way
in those cases where the claims of (in)justice are strong enough.
In his pre-war writings, Radbruch spoke of the tension between "the
demands of legal certainty," on one hand, and "the demands of justice and
expediency," on the other." While he adds that "[t]he three aspects of the
idea of law are of equal value, and in case of conflict there is no decision
between them but by the individual conscience," he also claims that "[i]t is
the professional duty of the judge to validate the law's claim to validity, to
sacrifice his own sense of the right to the authoritative command of the law,
to ask only what is legal and not if it is also just.' 12 As will be discussed at
greater length later, this strong-perhaps too-strong--equation of the
analysis of law and prescriptions for judicial behavior is characteristic of
both Radbruch's earlier work and his later writings.
Radbruch's Formula(s) would become a focal point in the famous 1958
debate between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller.' 3 Part of the dispute between
Hart and Fuller regarding Radbruch and his Formula(s), was about the
proper response to evil laws and evil regimes. Hart reads Radbruch as
encouraging the courts to treat the evil laws of the Nazi regime as "not law,"
and therefore no shield for a woman who tried to have her husband killed
under the rubric of one such law. 14  Hart, with some hesitation, would
support punishing the woman, but would prefer that it be done under frankly
"retrospective criminal legislation."' 5 Hart argued for the independent
virtue of responding to a moral dilemma with "candour" and "plain
speech.'
16
By contrast, Fuller viewed Radbruch's position both as a pragmatic
compromise in responding to a change from an evil regime,17 and as a deep
insight into the moral foundations of the nature of law. In particular, Fuller
11. Ibid., 118.
12. Ibid., 118-9.
13. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morality," 615-21; and Lon L.
Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart," Harvard Law Review
71 (1958): 648-57.
14. Apparently, both Hart and Fuller misunderstood the holding of a post-war West
German case they were discussing, as it had been misreported in an earlier issue of the
Harvard Law Review. See H.O. Pappe, "On the Validity of Judicial Decisions in the Nazi
Era," Modern Law Review 23 (1960): 261-3.
15. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morality, 620.
16. Ibid., 620, 621.
17. "Intolerable dislocations would have resulted from any ... wholesale outlawing of
all that [had] occurred [under the Nazis]. On the other hand, it was equally impossible to
carry forward into the new government the effects of every Nazi perversity that had been
committed in the name of law .... (Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law," 648).
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focused on the procedural injustices (the focus of his own "procedural
natural law theory"' 8), like secret and retroactive laws, which, he argued,
were contrary to "the very nature of law itself."' 9
As for the German court cases, and whether the courts made a mistake by
treating the unjust Nazi laws as "not law" (and Hart's argument that courts
and theorists should separate whether some norm is law from whether it
should be applied), Fuller wrote:
So far as the courts are concerned, matters certainly would not have been
helped if, instead of saying, "This is not law," they had said, "This is law
but it is so evil we will refuse to apply it." Surely moral confusion reached
its height when a court refuses to apply something it admits to be law.
2
0
The next Part of the article will revisit this aspect of the Hart-Fuller debate,
and question whether it is the "height" of "moral confusion" to speak of a
judge refusing to apply "something [the judge] admits to be law."
Both Radbruch and later proponents of his Formula(s) have focused on
particular court decisions. In the article introducing the Formula(s),
Radbruch made reference to a number of judicial decisions:
21
(1) A decision by a Wiesbaden Municipal Court declaring to be null and
void a statute declaring the property of the Jews to be forfeited to the
government. 22
(2) The conviction by a Thuringian Criminal Court of a defendant for
being an accomplice to murder, where the crime was based on his
having informed on a colleague who had written comments against a
prominent Nazi official on a bathroom wall; that anti-Nazi graffiti
subsequently had been 2_part of the grounds for convicting and
executing that colleague.
(3) The conviction and condemnation to death of two persons who had
worked as executioner's assistants under the Nazi regime.
24
In a later article, Robert Alexy gives three more recent examples:
25
18. Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law," and The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969).
19. Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law," 650.
20. Ibid., 655.
21. Radbruch also noted the intention of the Chief Public Prosecutor of Saxony to seek
criminal prosecutions of those responsible for "inhuman judicial decisions," even when those
decisions were grounded on Nazi statutes, and the decision of another Chief Prosecutor not
to prosecute a deserter from the Nazi army who killed an army official in the process of
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(4) The German Federal Constitutional Court's refusal to apply a Nazi
law holding that Jews lost their German nationality when they
emigrated (in a case in which the application of a will provision
turned on the nationality of a Jewish lawyer who had emigrated just
before World War II).26
(5) The German Federal Court's upholding a Jewish woman's demand of
return of securities from a German bank over the bank's objection that
she had lost her property claim under the Nazi statute mentioned in
the first case, above.
(6) The conviction by German courts of East German border guards and
their superiors, for the shooting deaths of fugitives trying to cross the
border, despite an East German statute that seemed to authorize the
use of firearms to prevent a "felony" of this sort.
28
These are all cases in which the West German or (post-unification) German
courts treated a Nazi or East German statute that had either authorized an
action or changed legal status or legal rights, as being without legal force
because of the injustice of the law.
Radbruch's Formula(s), and his conception of law, are based on the
notion that people may not expect their legal system to be uniformly just
and fair, but there is an expectation of minimal justice that comes with the
notion of "legality." This view--especially as it appears in the less well
known second version of Radbruch's Formula (that to be legal the rules
must at least "make an attempt at justice" 29)-could be translated into
Robert Alexy's well-known assertion: "Every legal system lays claim to
correctness.,30 And it seems to assert something more than Joseph Raz's
conclusion that law necessarily claims that it possesses legitimate authority
(as Raz points out, this claiming need not be well-grounded, and he in fact
claims that it rarely is 31). Though Raz's and Alexy's theoretical positions
appear to be similar, there are important differences, reflected, not least in
the fact that Raz sees law's claim to authority as consistent with a legal
25. With at least one of the examples, Radbruch's Formula was expressly quoted, and
another depended on precedent in which Radbruch's work was cited. Robert Alexy "A
Defense of Radbruch's Formula," in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order,




29. Radbruch, "Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law," 7.
30. Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, trans.
Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 34 (footnote omitted).
31. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 199. On
Raz's view about the obligation to obey the law, see ibid., 325-38.
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positivist view of law, while Alexy views his "correctness thesis" as central
to his critique of legal positivism.
And before being too quick to connect either of those theories to
Radbruch's post-war theory, one should observe that though some version
of the Alexy and Raz theories could be applied to individuals norms, they
are most apt when discussing normative systems as a whole (that is, the
question of what it is that makes a normative system as a whole
"law"/"legal" or "not law"), while Radbruch's Formula(s) are more clearly
focused on individual norms (whether individual norms are so unjust that
they are not, or no longer, "law").
In practice, the Radbruch Formula is most likely to be applied where
there has been some form of transition in the relevant regime, such that a
judge from one system or tradition is asked to apply (or not apply) the law
of another system or tradition: post-war Germany dealing with its Nazi
past; unified German dealing with the East German past; and so on. I am
unaware of any court using the Radbruch Formula to refuse enforcement of
otherwise valid legal norms enacted by its own legislature.32 As a matter of
practical politics, one assumes that even if there are such instances, they are
very rare.
II. THE FORMULA(S) AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
Within the Hart-Fuller debate and in Robert Alexy's discussion and
adaptation of the work, Radbruch's Formula(s) are generally presented as a
central part of an anti-legal positivist theory about the nature of law.33
Radbruch himself portrays his Formula(s), and his post-World War II
writings in general, as a turn away from his earlier espousal of legal
positivism.
34
32. Refusing enforcement on Radbruch-Formula grounds is to be distinguished from
more conventional forms of judicial invalidation of otherwise valid norms-e.g., holding the
norm invalid because it conflicted with a provision of the regime's own constitution or a
supra-national constitution or treaty to which the country is a signatory, like the European
Convention on Human Rights.
33. Radbruch, "Statutory Lawlessless and Supra-Statutory Law"; Alexy, "A Defense of
Radbruch's Formula" and The Argument from Injustice; Hart, "Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morality"; Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law"; see also Giovanni Sartor,
"Legality Policies and Theories of Legality: from Bananas to Radbruch's Formula," Ratio
Juris 22 (2009): 218-43.
34. Though, as earlier noted, see above note 3, there are also those who claim a greater
continuity and unity in Radbruch's work.
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However, it is important to clarify what it might mean to say that the
Formula(s) constitute a criticism of legal positivism, 35 as opposed to being
part of a theory within an entirely different debate. Legal positivism is a
theory about the nature of law,36 even if it is too often confused with
entirely different kinds of claims (e.g., about when and whether laws should
be obeyed, or about how statutes and constitutional provisions should be
interpreted). The question is to what extent the Radbruch Formula(s)
should be considered as not directed, or not primarily directed, towards
debates about the nature of law, but rather directed (primarily) towards
questions about how judges should decide cases.
At a surface level, there is no doubt that, whatever else it is, the Radbruch
Formula(s) do work as instructions to judges on how to decide cases. As
mentioned earlier, judicial decision-making (by West German courts
responding to actions purportedly done under the authorization of Nazi
laws) is the context for Radbruch's introduction of his Formula(s) in his
post-war articles, 37 and comparable decisions made by the courts in a
unified Germany, evaluating actions done purportedly under the
authorization of East German law, is the context for some of Alexy's
discussion of his version of the Radbruch Formula.38
Additionally, if the Formula(s) are to be understood as a conceptual
claim about the nature of law, then they are (by definition) claims about all
existing and all possible legal systems. That may just not be a good
description of the Formula(s). Consider Radbruch's argument that
significantly unjust norms are not valid legal norms: one could certainly
understand such a claim made internally within a particular legal system,
about the criteria of validity of that legal system. It is far less clear what is
meant by a theorist, like Radbruch, making this claim about all (and all
possible) legal systems.39
One can come at the problem from another direction, which clarifies that
Radbruch's primary purpose (and the purpose of most of those who support
35. Radbruch, along with Lon Fuller, asserted that legal positivism played a role in the
Nazis' rise to power in Germany. Stanley L. Paulson, "Lon L. Fuller, Gustav Radbruch, and
the 'Positivist' Theses," Law and Philosophy 13 (1994): 313-59.
36. Brian H. Bix, "Legal Positivism," in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law
and Legal Theory, ed. Martin P. Golding and William A. Edmundson (Oxford: Blackwell,
2005), 29-49.
37. Radbruch, "Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Legality," 1-6.
38. Alexy, "A Defense of Radbruch's Formula"; and The Argumentfrom Injustice.
39. I elaborate this point in the context of a critique of both Alexy and the later
Radbruch in Brian H. Bix, "Robert Alexy, Radbruch's Formula, and the Nature of Legal
Theory," Rechtstheorie 37 (2006): 139-49.
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application of his Formulas(s)) is likely the direction of judicial behavior,
not any analytical claim about the nature of law. To clarify through an
example: How would a proponent of Radbruch's Formula(s) respond to a
judge who applied an extremely unjust norm (without first using
Radbruch's test)? One possibility would be for the Radbruch follower to
say that what the judge applies, because it is an extremely unjust norm, is
simply not a legally valid norm. However, as will be discussed further
below, judges frequently apply norms that are not valid norms of their legal
system (e.g., extralegal moral norms). But that is clearly not what Radbruch
was getting at: he wanted judges not to apply these unjust norms. To see
the debate as strongly analogous to legal realist or Dworkinian debates
about whether certain norms or factors are "legal" or "extralegal" and
whether judges are obligated to apply them, or can do so at their
40cladiscretion, would clearly be a misreading. Radbruch's clear point
(understood by all interpreters) is that judges should not apply these norms.
Thus, the conclusion that what Radbruch is basically offering is a
prescription for judicial decision-making, not a conceptual (or other
theoretical) claim applicable to all (possible) legal systems.
The Formula(s) seem to entail, or depend upon, the view (a) that if a
norm is valid in a legal system, then it must be applied to a legal dispute
whenever it is relevant to the dispute; and (b) if a norm is not a valid norm
of a legal system, it should not (or cannot) be applied to a legal dispute
before the court. 4' As propositions describing current legal practices, both
claims seem to be false. As to the first claim, that valid legal norms are
always applied whenever they are relevant, it is a common principle in
many legal systems that judges have the power to modify or create
exceptions in rules (particularly judge-created rules, but also, in some
jurisdictions and on some occasions, statutes) when their application would
otherwise lead to an absurd or unjust result.
42
As for the second claim, that norms that are not valid in the legal system
are never applied, there are a number of significant exceptions. There are
40. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1977), 1-130.
41. I do not claim that either of the above claims is expressly made by Radbruch, but
they do appear to be assumptions of the Formula(s) he presents.
42. Of course, in most jurisdictions courts also have the authority, and frequently the
duty, to refuse to apply a statute when its application would be contrary to the country's
constitution or basic law, or contrary to the country's treaty obligations. However, this
example is less useful for the purpose of the present discussion, as many commentators
would characterize the conflict with the constitution or the treaty as making the statute
invalid.
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minor, technical exceptions: as when resolving a dispute requires a court to
apply norms from another legal system (e.g., in resolving a contract dispute,
when the contract was entered in another country), or norms of a non-public
organization (as when the dispute centers on the application of a corporate
or club charter), or even the norms of logic or mathematics.43 There are also
well-known general exceptions, when courts are authorized, or perhaps even
obligated, to apply extralegal moral or policy norms in the process of
elaborating, clarifying, or improving the law. In common-law countries,
like the United States and England, judicial development of the law is
accepted and frequent, even if not quite as central as it had been hundreds of
years ago. When courts change the law, the normative reasons justifying
the change (e.g., "justice requires that those who cause harm must
compensate for the harm" or "norms should be made as efficient as
possible") are almost always norms that are not already valid within the
legal system.44 However, judges see themselves as legally bound, or at least
legally free (and perhaps morally bound), to change the law in this way.
Given that "valid norm" cannot be equated with "norm that must be
applied," the direction to judges "not to apply a norm in particular
circumstances" is not helpfully translated into the claim that "that norm is
not valid" (or vice versa).
It must be noted that though (as I hope I have shown) one can clearly see
the theoretical difference between legally valid and invalid norms on one
hand, and whether or not to apply a norm to a legal dispute on the other
hand, the difference may be less evident for the kind of norms on which
Radbruch (and his followers) were focusing. Arguably, one would have no
trouble finding examples of judges applying norms that are extremely
unjust; one can even find numerous examples where the judge is applying
the unjust norm even though the judge considers herself to be doing this as a
matter of discretion rather than a matter of duty. However, these are often
cases where we might see the norms as unjust, but the judge does not. What
are likely rare are examples of judges applying norms they consider to be
extremely unjust in circumstances where they consider themselves to have
43. On the issue of the legal status of mathematics used in legal decisions, see Matthew
H. Kramer, "Why the Axioms and Theorems of Arithmetic are Not Legal Norms," Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 27 (2007): 555-62.
44. I am putting aside, for the moment, the claim occasionally still heard that most
common law reasoning is merely a process of the law "work[ing] itself pure," Omychund v.
Barker (Ch. 1744), 1 Atk. 21 at 33, 26 ER 15 at 22-23, that is, that such decisions are merely
discovering norms that were, in some sense, already part of the law. Few commentators
would accept this as universally true of common law decision-making, and there is little
evidence of which I am aware that Radbruch supported such a view.
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discretion whether to apply the norms or not. While justice may (by most
accounts) be an objective matter, it is a matter over which there is pervasive
disagreement. When we observe what we believe to be the court's
application of an extremely unjust law, the judge's perspective will almost
always be different. The judge will generally either not perceive the norm
as (extremely) unjust, or will believe that the unjust norm is one that she is
obligated to apply, despite its injustice.
Other natural law theorists have written on the problem of unjust laws,
some offering views comparable to Radbruch's. Alexy's position was
mentioned earlier. John Finnis writes the following on the topic of seriously
unjust laws:
In such a case, does the law as settled by social-fact sources, in losing its
directiveness for judges and citizens, lose also its legal validity? The
answer depends upon the discursive context in which the question arises.
If a course of reflection or discourse makes it appropriate to acknowledge
the rule's "settled" or "posited" character as cognizable by reference to
social-fact sources, one can say that it is legally valid though too unjust to
be obeyed or applied. Or if the discursive context makes it appropriate
instead to point up its lack of directiveness for judges and subjects alike,
one can say that the rule, despite its links to social-fact sources, is not only
not morally directive but is also legally invalid. Each way of speaking tells
an important part of the truth, or rather, tells the truth with an emphasis
that differs from the other's. 
45
Finnis's analysis can be seen as largely consistent with the argument
presented here. He notes that there is an important sense in which unjust
laws are still valid laws. Overall, his analysis is tied to his view that law has
a "double life": as a history of official action, and as a normative system
that plays a role in the practical reasoning of both citizens and judges.46 For
Finnis, the key conceptual point about unjust laws is not that they are not
laws, but that they are not laws "in the fullest sense," including in the sense
of creating reasons for judges to apply them (without modification) to legal
disputes.47 Finnis does cautiously approve the characterization of unjust
laws as "invalid," but only when that is understood as relative to direction to
judges, and also understood as only part of the proper understanding of law
and legal validity, where another part of the analysis would note the law's
validity.
45. John Finnis, "Natural Law Theories," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Edward N. Zalta (2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-theories/, sec. 4.
46. See, e.g., Finnis, "The Fairy Tale's Moral," Law Quarterly Review 115 (1999): 170;
"On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism," Notre Dame Law Review 75 (2000): 1602-6.
47. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 351-66.
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To return to the original topic: if Radbruch's intention was to direct
judges (or if that is the most charitable reading of his Formula(s)), why did
he choose this somewhat indirect route of a theory about the nature of legal
validity? This question would require more space (and more historical
expertise) than I can offer here, but I can propose a conjecture, for whatever
it might be worth. Part of the reason Radbruch may have cloaked his
prescription for decision-making in a conceptual theory about law may be
found in the legal and political culture, and indeed the general social
expectations, of the time(s) and place(s) in which Radbruch lived. In
continental Europe, the strong expectation was that the law was fully
present in the civil codes, and the judge's only task was to apply the law.
This may not have been a universal belief, but the fact that the Free Law
Movement of that time48 was considered highly radical for even suggesting
that judges had and should have discretion, indirectly shows the rigid view
of judging in the conventional thought of that day. Against this backdrop,
one can see why a theorist might not merely suggest that judges should
modify or refuse to enforce otherwise valid law. Such a prescription is
easier to make in a common law country (where it is understood that judges
develop the law, even if they might sometimes claim that they were merely
"discovering" it), and among modem legal theorists, who unapologetically
discuss judicial discretion and judicial lawmaking. For Radbruch, perhaps
the only way to make prescriptions for judicial decision-making palatable to
his audience was to coat them in claims about the validity of individual
norms.
1II. CONCLUSION
This paper has raised questions about whether Gustav Radbruch's
Formula(s) are best or most charitably understood on their own terms, as a
claim about the nature of law, rather than differently and more narrowly, as
a prescription about how judges should decide cases. In most legal systems,
courts frequently apply (and see themselves as bound to apply) norms that
are not valid within their legal system, and the courts also on occasion do
not apply (and see themselves as bound not to apply) otherwise applicable
norms that are valid norms within their legal system. This is part of the
complex role of judges, particularly (but not exclusively) within common
48. See, e.g., Christopher Berry Gray, The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia, (New
York: Garland Publishing, 1999), 1: 314-18; and James E. Herget and Stephen Wallace,
"The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism," Virginia Law
Review 73 (1987): 399-455.
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law legal systems. Judges' roles include the resolution of disputes where
the ruling norms come from outside the home legal system (or, from outside
any legal system), and the courts may also have responsibilities to develop
the law and to avoid unjust or absurd applications of otherwise valid
norms.
49
This paper has argued that it would thus be more charitable to read the
Radbruch Formula(s) as prescriptions for judicial decision-making rather
than as descriptive, conceptual or analytical claims about the nature of law.
Or, to put the same point a different way, reconstructing the Formula(s) in
this manner makes them more sensible and defensible.
49. Andrew Gold, "Absurd Results, Scrivener's Errors, and Statutory Interpretation,"
University of Cincinnati Law Review 75 (2006): 25-85, argues that some applications of the
absurdity doctrine of statutory interpretation may be a following of the objective meaning of
the statutory text rather than an overriding of the text. Even if that is granted, there still
remain numerous examples of judicial modification or overriding of legal rules in the name
of morality, reason, policy, or simply coherence.
BIX

